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Creation of Carrier-Passenger
Relationship
The duties of a common carrier to a passenger are
much greater than those owed to the public in general.
Because of this fact, it is often important to determine
just when and how the carrier-passenger relationship is
created. The relationship is founded on contract, either
express or implied in fact." In this contract, there are two
essentials: (a) The undertaking of the person to travel
as a passenger, and (b) The acceptance by the carrier of
that person as a passenger.
2
The failure to distinguish between the creation of the
relationship and the duties and obligations arising in con-
nection with the relationship, has led some courts into the
error of holding that the duties of a carrier to a passenger
are founded on contract.3 If the court means an express
'Moore: Carriers, (2d. ed.), volume 2, page 922, states the idea as
follows: "The status is a contract relationship which commences
when the passenger has put himelf at a proper time and place into
the care of the carrier with a bona fide intention of being trans-
ported, and the carrier has expressly or impliedly received and
accepted him as a passenger." See also Dobie: Bailments and Car-
riers, page 537; Geiger v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 247 Pa. 287; B ricker v.
Phila., etc. Ry. Co. 132 Pa. 1; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Price, 96
Pa. 256; Blair v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 36 Pa. Superior Ct.
319.
2Hutchinson: Carriers, (3rd. ed.), volume 2, page 997, and cases
cited in Note 1. See also Weber v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 151 N.
W. 852, L.R.A. 1918A, 626.
3See Todd, Admx. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 274 Ill. 201,
113 N. E. 95, L. R. A. 1916 F, 543, where the Illinois court seems to
infer that the duties spring from the contract creating the relation-
ship.
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contract, it is clearly erroneous. However, it is possible
that the statement has reference to the so-called "contracts
implied in law". If this is their idea, their error lies in the
fact that they are adhering to an early theory of quasi-
contracts. In fact, the duties of a common carrier toward
a passenger are imposed by law irrespective of any promise
or agreement.' It is not necessary to employ the fiction of
a promise. The duties are in the nature of quasi-con-
tractual obligations arising by virtue of the carrier's
calling5
As a general rule, the responsibility of a carrier toward
a person as a passenger commences upon the acceptance
by the carrier. 6 This acceptance may be (a) an express
acceptance of the individual by present assent, or (b) an
acceptance, in advance, of any one complying with the
carrier's offer. Hence, a person desiring transportation
*Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L. 169, 7 L. R.
A. 435; Carroll v. Railroad, 58 N. Y. 126, 17 Am. Rep. 221; Fetter on
Carriers of Passengers, section 220. Dean Roscoe Pound, in an article
in 25 Harvard Law Review, states the proposition thus: "One who is
engaged in a public calling, in addition to the general negative duties
resting upon all men, is subject to certain affirmative duties imposed
directly by law".
5Between the years 1673 and 1705, the courts resorted to the
fiction of a promise "implied in law" in order to enforce quasi-
contractual obligations, the remedy being an action of general
assumpsit. At first, the fictitious promise was a necessary element
in the declaration of the plaintiff, but naturally enough, proof was
not required, since the whole thing was fiction. Today, the courts
no longer resort to the fiction, but frankly state that the obligation is
imposed directly by law. In brief, we have: First-The relationship
created by a contract, express or implied in fact; Second-When
the relationship has been established, the law imposes certain
specific duties upon the carrier correlative to certain rights existing
in the passenger.
6 See Note 1; Thus, a person climbing on the rear bumper of a
crowded summer street car and riding thereon is not a passenger
unless the evidence in the case shows an accep.ance of him as such.
Coyne v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 239 Pa. 17. The language of the Court
in Pitcher v. People's St. Ry., 154 Pa. 560 is: "The Company was
entitled to some knowledge of his intention to assume the relation
of passenger before being charged with the duty of taking care of
him as a passenger."
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may become a passenger in either of two ways: (a) by
securing the express acceptance of 'himself as a passenger,
or (b) by complying exactly with the terms and conditions
of the carrier's offer or "holding out"."* In either case,
the real criterion is acceptance by the carrier. In this con-
nection, it is necessary to distinguish between the case
where the plaintiff is suing the carrier as a passenger and
the case where he sues as a non-passenger. If a carrier
refuses to accept a person as a passenger, that person does
not become a passenger. The carrier has merely violated
his right to become a passenger-not his right as a pas-
senger. In such a case, the plaintiff's only remedy is an
action for damages for wrongful refusal.7
With this preliminary discussion in view, we may ex-
amine certain classes of cases in which the existence of
the carrier - passenger relation has been brought into
question.
Payment of Fare
The fact that a person purchases a ticket does not
necessarily mean that he is liable for the payment of fare at
any definite time. He may ride on that day, or he may
redeem the ticket without riding at all. Hence the mere
purchase of a ticket does not make one a passenger.8 It is
true that in some cases, the courts have emphasized the
fact that a ticket was purchased. However, this is true
because in those cases, the purchase was some evidence of
a bona fide intent to become a passenger.
Contrary to a popular belief, neither the possession of
a ticket nor the payment of fare are absolute essentials to
e*Powell v. Ph. & Reading Ry., 220 Pa. 638--"The relation of
Carrier-Passenger begins as soon as one intending in good faith to
become a passenger enters in a lawful manner upon the carrier's
premises to engage passage." See Geiger v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 234
Pa. 454; Lackawanna & B. R. R. v. Chenowith, 52 Pa. 382 (where
plaintiff attached his private car to the train).
THogner v. Boston Elev. R. Co., 198 Mass. 260, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.),
960, 84 N. E.464; Illinois Centr. R. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 168 Ill. 115, 39
L. R. A. 148; 48 N. E. 294; 4 Elliott, Railroads (2d. ed.) section 1581.
Vandegrift v. West Jersey & S. R. R., 71 N. J. L.-, 60 Atl. 184.
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the creation of the relationship." Thus, one who rides with
the full expectation of paying his way is a passenger.
Getting on the carrier's vehicle amounts to an implied
tender of fare. The delay of the conductor in collecting
does not prevent such person from being a passenger. In
other words, a person thus situated is a passenger from
the time he enters the vehicle-not from the moment he
pays his fare.10
Waiting at Station for a Train
The relation may arise before any actual transporta-
tion. A person intending to ride, in a vehicle before it
starts, is a passenger." A person in a waiting room or on
the platform, awaiting the arrival of his train is a pas-
senger.11  But a person on the public street, intending
to "catch" a train, is not a passenger merely because of his
intent.18
Boarding a Moving Train
When a train starts away from the station or platform
from which it has received passengers, it thereby with-
draws the implied offer to persons to become passengers."'
9"The possession of a ticket is not an absolute essential ..... ;
it is merely one element to be considered .... ", 18 Fed. 221; See
also 12 L. R. A. 823, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 142, McGill v. Rowland, 3 Pa.
451; Ham v. Del., etc., Canal Co., 142 Pa., 617; Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. 256. These authorities do hold, however,
that non-payment of fare is a good cause for rescission of the con-
tract of passage.
1oMellquist v. The Wasco, 53 Fed. 546.
liHebrik v. Carr, 29 Fed. 298.
"2See Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Galliher, 89 Va. 639, 16 S. E. 935;
Coswell v. Boston & W. R. R., 98 Mass. 194. However, one at sta-
tion, after abandonment of intention, or merely out of curiosity, or
for some purpose foreign to transportation, is not a passenger. See
Gillin v. P. R. R., 59 Pa. 129; Ambler v. Phila. Ry. Co., 39 Pa. Super-
ior Ct. 198.
'SRailway v. Smith, 86 Fed. 292: "He (the plaintiff) did nothing
to notify any officer or agent of defendant company that he was even
a prospective passenger."
"dTompkins v. Port. R. L. & P. Co., 77 Or. 174, 150 Pac. 758;
Chaffee v. Old Colony Ry. Co., 17 R. I. 658, 24 Atl. 141.
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Any one attempting to board the train while moving is not
a passenger. 1" However, it often happens that a person is
successful in getting on the train. Then the question
arises as to when that person becomes entitled to the
protection of a passenger. The Massachusetts view is that
he becomes a passenger when he has passed the danger
and has placed himself in the proper place for the carriage
of passengers-the seat,16  Pennsylvania, on the other
hand, holds that he becomes a passenger as soon as he
reaches the platform in safety. In Sharrer v. Paxson, 171
Pa. 26, plaintiff had attempted to get on a moving train and
had reached the platform, when the carrier's servant
pushed him off. It was held that plaintiff was a passenger
and entitled to the same protection accorded to any other
passenger. In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Reed, 60 Fed. 694,
a servant of the carrier, while aiding plaintiff to board a
moving train, acted negligently so as to injure plaintiff.
The carrier was held liable for the injury.
Boarding Trolley or Omnibus
The early view was that the relationship began when a
person with intent of riding put his foot on the step or his
hand on the rail of the vehicle." However, this view has
not been followed so closely within recent years. When
a car stops and its doors are opened, that amounts to an
implied consent to take persons as passengers. The same
is true where a carrier stops in response to a signal by the
person wishing to ride. Some cases hold that a person
intending to board a bus or trolley becomes a passenger
IgMerrill v. Eastern Railroad, 139 Mass. 238, 1 N. E. 548; Boul-
frois v. United Traction Co., 210 Pa. 263; Sharer v. Paxson, 171 Pa.
26.
2$See Merrill v. Eastern Railroad, 139 Mass. 238, 1 N. E. 548.
"tThe leading case is Brien v. Bennett, 8 C. & P. (Eng.) 724. The
English decision was followed in Central Ry. v. Smith, 74 Md. 216, 21
AtL 206; Gordon v. West End St. Ry., 175 Mass. 181, 55 N. E.990;
Davey v. Greenfield & T. F. St. Ry., 177 Mass. 106, 58 N.E. 172;
Smith v. St. Paul City Ry., 32 Minn. 1, 18 N. W. 827, and many
other cases.
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the minute the vehicle slackens its speed in response to a
signal." Other courts say that the relation does not arise
until he actually reaches the vehicle.' 9
Stealing a Ride
One who enters a vehicle without the knowledge or
consent of the carrier, and with the intent to ride to his
destination free of charge, is not entitled to the protection
given to a passenger. He is a trespasser and rides at his
own risk.20 The same rule applies to a person who, when
his fare is demanded, refuses to pay and remains on the
vehicle by force or threats.21 Also, any fraud or deceit on
the part of the person riding prevents him from becoming
entitled to the position of a passenger. 22  However, if the
person has boarded the vehicle under a bona fide mistake,
the carrier cannot treat him as a trespasser. Thus, where
plaintiff entered a train and sought transportation on a
limited ticket one hour after the time limit, the court held
that the carrier had overstepped its authority when it
ejected him as a trespasser .
2
1 Chicago St. Ry. v. Williams, 140 Ill. 275, 29 N. E. 672; Finkeldy
v. Omnibus Cable Co., 114 Cal. 28, 45 Pac. 996.
'9 Duchenim v. Boston Elec. Ry., 186 Mass. 353, 71 N. E. 780.
20See 2 L. R. A. 167. This necessarily follows from the fact that
the knowledge or consent of the carrier is an essential to the
establishment of the relationship. See 25 L. R. A. 700.
ZiToledo, etc. & W. RR. v. Beggs, 85 11. 80.
22See 28 L. R. A. 749. The Court, in Condran v. Chicago, M. & St.
Passenger Ry. Co., 67 Fed. 522, sums up the matter: "One riding on
a train by fraud, stealth, without the payment of fare, takes upon
himself all the risks of the ride, and if injured by an accident hap-
pening to the train, not due wanton recklessness or wilfullness of the
company, -he cannot recover." For other examples, see Fitzmaurice
v. N.Y., N.H., & H. R. Co., 192 Mass. 159, 6 L. R. A. (N. .) 1147;
and Harman v. Jensen, 176 Fed. 521.
23Arnold v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 115 Pa. 135. The court states
that the plaintiff is not conclusively presumed to be a trespasser, but
should be given an opportunity to show that his act was the result of
an innocent mistake. In this case, plaintiff, after being told by the
conductor of his mistake, offered to pay his fare, under protest. The
conductor refused this offer and ejected the plaintiff at the first stop,
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Riding as Employee of Carrier
An employee riding as a part of his work is not a
passenger.2, But if he rides to and from his work, or if his
wages are reduced proportionately because he rides, then
he is given the same protection accorded to any other
passenger.2
5
Riding as Employee of Company Other Than Carrier
In the absence of any statute, such persons are not
usually considered as passengers. Pennsylvania courts
have held that postal clerks,26 servants of sleeping car
companies, 27 and news agents are not passengers.28  Inso-
far as suits for injuries or wrongful death are concerned,
the matter is regulated in Pennsylvania by statute. The
Act of April 4, 1868, P.L. 58 provides that when any person
shall sustain personal injuries or loss of life while lawfully
engaged or employed on or about the roads, works, depots,
and premises of a railroad company, or in or about any
train or car therein or thereon, of which company such
person is not an employee, the right of action and recovery
in all such cases against the company shall be only as
would exist if such person were an employee."
Riding in Place not Intended for Passengers
A person riding in a place not intended for passengers
does not thereby accept the carrier's invitation. For in-
24Ryan v. Cumberland Valley Ry. Co., 23 Pa. 348; St. Bernard
Cypress Co. v. Johnson, 222 Fed. 246, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873.
25O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley Ry. Co., 59 Pa. 239; Creed v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 86 Pa.. 139; McNulty v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, 182 Pa. 479.
26 Martin v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 195 Pa. 499; Pennsylvania
Railroad v. Price, 96 Pa. 256 (see 113 U. S. 218). The weight of
authority on this point is contra to the Pennsylvania holding; See
10 Corpus Juris 1053 and cases cited therein.
27Murray v. Philadelphia, etc. Ry. Co., 249 Pa. 126; Coleman v.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 242 Pa. 304; but see Lewis v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, 220 Pa. 317.
28Smallwood v. Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co., 215 Pa. 540.
NSee Miller v. Northern Central Ry. Co., 216 Pa. 105.
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stance, one riding on the engine cab, in a mail car, or a
baggage car, is not a passenger.8 0 Nor does a person be-
come a passenger by riding on a freight train.31 In this
class of cases, the fact that the employees of the carrier
have knowledge that the person is riding in an unsuitable
place does not make that person a passenger. 32 However,
if the carrier has permitted persons to ride in such places,
or if the person can show a custom, then the carrier will be
held to the same responsibility as it owes to a passenger
in the customary places.33 In O'Donnell v. Allegheny Rail-
road Company, 59 Pa. 239, the lower court charged the jury
to the effect that the baggage car was an improper place
for a passenger, if there without the consent or knowledge
of the carrier, and to be there was sufficient to establish
contributory negligence. The Supreme Court held this
charge erroneous because there was evidence in the case
showing a custom of the railroad to permit plaintiff to ride
in the baggage car for a period of over two months.
In connection with this subject, it is well to note a dis-
tinction between (a) persons already passengers who go
into a place not provided for them, and (b) persons intend-
ing to become passengers who go into the wrong place.
In the former, the person does not thereby lose his char-
acter as a passenger. The only effect may be to render
him guilty of contributory negligence so as to prevent his
recovery for any injury sustained.3' In the latter case, the
person never becomes a passenger.38 Of course, if the
person is riding in an unsuitable place by the direction of
SoRiding on engine cab-Waterbury v. N. Y., etc. Railroad, 17
Fed. 671. Riding in baggage car-Buzby v. Philadelphia Traction Co.,
126 Pa. 559. Riding in mail car-Bricker v. Phila., etc. Ry. Co., 132
Pa. 1.
31But see Creed v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 86 Pa. 139, where the
carrier had permitted persons to ride on freight train as passengers.
32See cases cited in Note 30.
30'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Company, 59 Pa. 239;
Creed v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 86 Pa. 139; Reber v. Bond, 38 Fed.
822.
"'Bard v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 176 Pa. 97.
85Bricker v. Phila., etc. Ry. Co. 132 Pa. 1.
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the employee of the carrier, he is a passenger. In
Mittleman v. Philadelphia Transit Company, 221 Pa. 485,
plaintiff was riding on the platform of a crowded car by
the express direction of the conductor. The court held that
he was a passenger.
Children Riding Free
Most railroads permit children under a certain age to
ride at half fare, and some to ride free of charge. These
are passengers and entitled to the same protection and
care as those who have paid full fare. If a child accepts
the invitation of an employee of the carrier to ride free,
he becomes a passenger.8 6 Upon principle, however, it is
difficult to justify the decisions so holding. Of course, if
the employee had the authority to give free rides, then the
cases would seem sound. But no one would contend that
an employee of a common carrier acts within the scope of
his actual or apparent authority when he invites people to
ride without paying.
Miscellaneous Cases
It 'is impossible to consider all of the various situations
that arise in connection with this question. However, there
are a few other cases worth considering. Thus, one who
rides on a "drover's pass" is a passenger." As implied in
the section of this article on "Payment of Fare", a person
riding gratuitously, or upon a pass, is accorded the same
protection as that given any other passenger.38 Most of
the cases hold that a person riding as the guest of an em-
a8See Chicago Ry. v. Caseby, 9 Ill. App. 632; Danbeck v. New
Jersey Traction Co., 5 N.J.L. 463; Hestonville Passenger Ry. Co. v.
Grey, I Walker (Pa.) 523.
8TSee Rowdin v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 208 Pa. 263. A "drover's
pass" is a pass whereby the shipper of livestock is transported in ac-
cordance with the contract of shipment, or by arrangement with
the company, over the lines of a. railroad, for the purpose of feed-
ing, watering, or otherwise caring for the livestock which he ac-
companies. See Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 665.
88See 25 L. R. A. 491, and cases cited on "Payment of Fare".
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ployee is not a passenger, basing their decision on the
rather logical argument that whatever relationship exists,
is between the employee and the person.39
Carlisle, Pa. W. REESE HITCHENS
39See Waterbury v. New York, etc. R.R., 17 Fed. 671; Condran
v. Chicago, etc. Ry., 67 Fed. 522; Janny v. Great Northern Ry., 65
N. W. 458. But see Wilkes v. B. R. & P. Ry. Co., 216 Pa. 355, where
a person riding on the engine with the permission of carrier's em-
ployee was held to be a passenger.
For further information on this subject, in general, see 10
Corpus Juris, Sections 1037-1046 and 1053-1062; 4 Ruling Case Law,
Sections 470-486 and 489-498; 19 Harvard Law Review 250.
